The Philosophical Nature of Argumentation from the Signs of Creation in the Theological System of the Holy Quran
"The signs of creation are not merely proofs of God's existence, but windows into a deeper understanding of divine wisdom, mercy, and providence - manifest in every corner of the universe, from the boundless heavens to invisible particles."
"In an era where philosophical and theological discourses often confine themselves to rigid deductive and a priori frameworks, this article offers a fresh perspective on the 'argument from creation' in the Quran. By emphasizing the non-deductive nature of these arguments and comparing them to scientific methods like Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), the author demonstrates how the Quran presents faith not as a product of abstract propositions, but as the fruit of a living, experiential encounter with the world. This approach both addresses contemporary critiques of classical proofs and establishes an inseparable connection between rationality, experience, and religious intuition. This article is essential reading for those concerned with reconciling modern science with Quranic theology."
Abstract
One of the Quran’s primary argumentative methods in theological discourse is reasoning through the “Signs of Creation” (Āyāt al-Khalq). Reducing these non-deductive arguments to deductive ones leads to a failure in appreciating their epistemic value and intended audience. The nature of āyah-based arguments resembles scientific reasoning grounded in Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), abductive reasoning, or other non-deductive forms. The presentation of diverse Signs of Creation (tasrīf al-āyāt), with their cumulative character, can yield faith, knowledge, and certainty, facilitate a posteriori discovery of necessary truths, and rely on experience without reducing theological propositions to falsifiable claims. Arguments from āyāt must not be conflated with the “Argument from Design” (burhān al-naẓm), as they differ in both methodology and conclusions. The audience for such arguments should not be presumed to be laypeople; rather, rational thinkers (ulū al-albāb) are their primary addressees. Islamic faith requires even those employing a priori deductive arguments in theology to grasp the theological significations of these signs and properly understand their Lord’s āyāt.
Keywords: Religious epistemology, philosophy of religion, Signs of Creation, non-deductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, Quranic theology, Argument from Design.
1. Introduction
Various intellectual paradigms exist across schools of thought for discovering and rationally justifying theological propositions concerning the Origin (mabda’) and Resurrection (ma’ād). Among these, understanding the Quran’s theological methodology holds paramount importance for Islamic thought. One of its primary cognitive approaches is referencing the Signs of Creation. The Quran abounds with appeals to āyāt and their implications regarding cosmogony and eschatology—from plant growth and winds to ships sailing seas, barren lands revived by rain, embryos developing into full-term infants—all carrying significations for reflective minds. Discovering these signs’ meanings and contemplating creation’s phenomena constitute essential “religious experiences” the Quran expects from Muslims (indeed all humans).
This study examines the philosophical status and epistemic value of this argumentative method, significant for two key perspectives:
Epistemological: Since referencing āyāt necessitates “experiencing the world” and yields a posteriori knowledge, it reveals experience’s role even in Islam’s foundational thought, compensating for Muslim philosophers’ neglect of empirical dimensions (see: Motahhari, 2000, vol.13, pp.375-380). It also clarifies non-deductive reasoning’s place.
Theological/Philosophical: It opens avenues for discussing creation-signs in cosmogony/escatology while providing a measured response to empirical approaches in theology. Contemporary interest in natural-world-based theological arguments, influenced by Muslim philosophical paradigms, raises concerns among some believers who prioritize a priori “pure reason” arguments. Revisiting the “argument from creation-signs” addresses these concerns.
This study focuses specifically on “creation-signs” (not Quranic verses or miracles, though these also belong to the broader āyah category). Its structure comprises: 1) lexical analysis and definitions, 2) epistemological examination of āyah-based arguments.
2. Lexicology and Definition
Lexicologists note multiple meanings for “āyah,” but the core definition across sources is “al-‘alāmah” (sign). Pre-Islamically, it denoted traces of desert campsites—vestiges gradually erased by time (Āzarnowsh, 2020), as in the pre-Islamic verse: “For whom are the dwellings, faded by time?/Naught remains but ruins like pen-strokes.” (Shaykhū, 1991, p.444)
An āyah inherently contains a semiotic component. Other meanings (e.g., “parable,” “marvel”) derive contextually from this core signification. Based on linguistic and Quranic usage, we define:
Āyah: A reality that signifies another reality, enabling either 1) knowledge or 2) remembrance of that signified reality.
The relationship between the āyah )verse(h and and its Revealer is primarily epistemic, not necessarily causal (cf. Q2:248, 3:41). Quranic usage divides into:
Creation-Signs: Ordinary natural phenomena (e.g., diurnal cycles) that upon reflection reveal wonder.
While “miracle” (mu’jizah) is a theological term for type 2, the Quran uses only “āyah” or “bayyinah” (e.g., Q7:106-108). Crucially, ordinary creation also constitutes āyāt manifesting divine wisdom, power, and mercy.
3. The Nature of Argumentation from Creation-Signs
Key features of āyah-based reasoning:
A) Its signification is often non-deductive, resembling abductive reasoning/IBE. Pre-Islamic and Quranic usages (e.g., inferring cosmic purposiveness from heavens/earth) reflect this.
B) Though non-truth-preserving, such arguments are truth-conducive. Their cumulative force matters—Quranic “tasrīf al-āyāt” (diverse presentation) underscores this accretive nature.
C) Requiring both observation and reflection, they engage rational intuitions. Quranic calls to “reflect” (e.g., Q13:3, 16:11) transcend Aristotelian syllogism, constituting persuasive reasoning yielding theoretical knowledge.
D) Epistemic weight varies—some āyāt are “clear signs” (āyāt bayyināt). Aggregating arguments can elevate certainty. Since Islamic salvation requires conventional certainty in fundamentals, āyah-based reasoning provides valid grounds for theological faith (e.g., Quranic appeals to cosmic phenomena prompting belief).
Critically, reducing āyah-based arguments to the “Argument from Design” misrepresents their methodology and scope. Unlike the latter’s limited deductive framework, creation-signs reveal nuanced truths (divine benevolence, resurrection’s possibility, etc.). Forcing them into syllogistic molds parallels misconstruing scientific induction—a mistake leading to Humean skepticism.
4. The Importance of Understanding the Signs of Creation
When faced with God’s signs – particularly the signs of creation – humans exhibit various responses. The Quran sometimes evaluates human actions positively (such as believing in the signs) and sometimes negatively. The number of verses addressing negative human responses to “signs” far exceeds those mentioning positive responses. Some negative human behaviors toward the signs include: neglect of the signs, turning away from them, denial of the signs, false accusation against the signs, oppression through the signs, arrogance toward the signs, mocking the signs, forgetting the signs, disbelief in the signs, lack of conviction in the signs, arguing about the signs, deviant thinking (heresy) regarding the signs, rejection of the signs, and being deaf and blind to the signs. In many cases, these signs refer specifically to “signs of creation” rather than revealed signs. For example, in Surah Yunus (10:7), it speaks of “neglect of the signs,” and based on the context starting from verse 5, it clearly refers to “neglect of the signs of creation”:
“He it is Who made the sun a shining brightness and the moon a light, and ordained for it stages that you might know the computation of years and the reckoning. Allah did not create this but with truth; He makes the signs clear for a people who know. (5) Most surely in the variation of the night and the day, and what Allah has created in the heavens and the earth, there are signs for a people who guard (against evil). (6) Surely those who do not hope in Our meeting and are pleased with this world’s life and are content with it, and those who are heedless of Our signs, (7) These it is whose abode is the fire because of what they earned.” (8)
Based on these Quranic emphases, it appears that the Quran expects all its audience to understand the meanings of the signs of creation and not to be like the deaf and blind toward them: “And who, when they are reminded of the signs of their Lord, do not fall down thereat deaf and blind” (25:73). The signs fill the entire life of a believer: from the heavens and earth, the moon and sun, the stars, family, social life, lands and seas, to the simplest events like animals carrying loads. It is as if the Quran expects the believer, in the midst of daily life, to see in everything a theological and monotheistic significance, to recognize God’s names, and to have clear perceptions about the origin, resurrection, and the purposeful nature of creation. Such faith is far more vibrant and practical than mere abstract theological or philosophical assent. In other words, one cannot be content with an abstract argument for theism while treating the signs of creation as if they carried no significance. Whoever fails to see meaning in the signs of creation is among those who have fallen deaf and blind to them. The signs of creation carry multiple meanings, and proving the Creator’s existence is only one of them. Understanding the signs of creation is among the simplest “religious experiences” expected of every believer. A true believer can “recite” the verses of the book of creation just as they recite the revealed Book.
“The Quranic argument from creation is not a simple deductive proof, but rather a network of non-deductive arguments that lead to faith and certainty through the accumulation of natural signs. This method invites its audience not to superficial thinking, but to profound reflection that aligns with contemporary scientific epistemology.”
5. The Audience of Argumentation Through Signs
It has sometimes been assumed that referring to the signs of creation is merely one method of knowing God – a relatively basic method suitable for common people – while the methods of philosophers (i.e., deductive philosophical-theological arguments) or mystics (mystical unveilings) are considered advanced methods for elites. This misconception is typically held by those with philosophical/mystical orientations who, in explaining the difference between the Quran’s approach and their philosophical approach, propose this view. They usually interpret the Quran’s references to signs as a form of the “argument from design,” which they consider weak, capable at best of proving the existence of a “designer,” and sometimes they even doubt its validity as an argument. They might sarcastically remark that “a theology derived from observing the creation of camels is a very shallow theology.” In their view, something like Mulla Sadra’s (d. 1045 AH) “Argument of the Veracious” (burhan al-siddiqin) based on the “primacy of existence” is a far more appropriate method for understanding/proving monotheism. These individuals typically consider themselves rationalists, downplay the value of experience and empirical science, and rely primarily on philosophical arguments or ultimately on mystical unveilings. If reminded that the theological style of the Quran and the Prophet differs from their philosophical-mystical approaches, they might accuse the critic of “literalism” and “superficiality.” I call this misconception the “commoner’s view” because it considers the Quran’s references to signs as meant only for ordinary people. Several points are worth noting here:
Understanding the signs of creation is something God has invited everyone to. Those who ignore these signs are precisely those who have fallen deaf and blind to God’s signs. The Quran states: “And who, when they are reminded of the signs of their Lord, do not fall down thereat deaf and blind” (25:73).
One characteristic of those with diseased hearts is that they consider people’s faith “foolish”: “And when it is said to them, ‘Believe as the people have believed,’ they say, ‘Shall we believe as the foolish have believed?’ Now surely they themselves are the foolish, but they do not know” (2:13). In contrast, the Quran mentions a group who, upon hearing the Prophet’s call to monotheism, immediately believed: “Our Lord, we have heard a caller calling to faith, saying, ‘Believe in your Lord,’ so we believed” (3:193). This group’s cognitive approach is described in the preceding verses:
“Most surely in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day there are signs for men of understanding. (190) Those who remember Allah standing and sitting and lying on their sides and reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth: ‘Our Lord, You have not created this in vain! Glory be to You! Save us then from the chastisement of the fire.'” (191)
The foundation of this group’s faith was reflection on the signs of creation – reflection that likely followed a non-deductive structure, leading from contemplation of the heavens and earth to recognizing creation’s purposefulness and thence to belief in resurrection. The Quran describes them as “men of understanding” (ulu’l-albab) (3:190), a description incompatible with the “commoner’s view.”
Abandoning the Quran’s style of presenting theological knowledge amounts to “neglecting the Quran” and “turning away from the Reminder.” The general principle is that the Quran guides to what is most upright: “Most surely this Quran guides to that which is most upright” (17:9). In our context, we can claim that knowledge gained through recognizing and believing in the signs is far more stable than knowledge gained through abstract theological-philosophical propositions. The latter, at best, provides theoretical assent based on abstract concepts like existence and contingency. But knowledge gained through understanding the signs is concrete cognition that permeates the believer’s entire life, placing rational and theological intuitions within the fabric of human existence. Sleep, wakefulness, language, spouse, sky, earth, stars, ships sailing the seas, blowing winds, plants growing from soil, birds flying – all become signs pointing to “Him.” With such knowledge, one can experience religious life, feel awe, shed tears, and smile. This is the kind of knowledge that can form a solid foundation for Islamic life. The knowledge derived from signs and the theological intuitions received from creation constitute a form of religious experience and mystical encounter with the world – one that requires no Sufi practices or asceticism, being universally accessible. This experience structurally involves sensory observation of the sign accompanied by rational and theological intuitions that come alive during contemplation, making the thinker aware of them.
Rejecting the “commoner’s view” does not mean rejecting deductive methods or philosophical argumentation or theological dialectics, but rather rejecting the disparagement of the non-deductive methods the Quran presents. Deductive methods are necessary and may remove mental barriers for some people. We even find similar arguments in the Quran itself (e.g., 52:35, 21:22). The Prophet’s successors, especially when confronting heretics, employed philosophical-dialectical methods to facilitate faith. In short: philosophical activity in theology is not prohibited, but reducing theology to it while treating the Quran’s primary method as common is unacceptable.
6. On Falsifiability and Necessity in the Recognition of Divine Signs
If we employ a posteriori reasoning (reliant on experience) to arrive at a truth, have we thereby reduced that truth to something “falsifiable”? Suppose proposition *p* is the conclusion of an a posteriori argument. Can we conceive of a state of affairs in which, had the world been observed differently, *p* would be deemed false? If we do not accept *p* as true a priori and instead defer its truth to experience—while a priori acknowledging the possibility that the state of the world might not confirm *p*—can we later, upon empirically deriving *p*, claim necessity for *p*? Or does *p*’s status degrade to a contingent fact?
Such questions pertain to the relationship between experience and falsifiability, as well as between necessity and a posteriori propositions. To clarify my position, certain distinctions must be made.
For a proposition to be empirically investigable, two conditions may be considered: (C1) Prior to experience, a state of affairs can be described that would confirm *p* (verifiability). (C2) Prior to experience, a state of affairs can be described that would refute *p* (falsifiability).
In the author’s view, the condition for empirical investigability is that either C1 or C2 holds. There are cases where propositions are empirically investigable yet only verifiable. To illustrate, imagine an infinite desert filled with stones. An unknown man claims that among these stones lies a rare and precious gem composed of lapis lazuli and ruby. If one searches and finds no such stone, the man insists that the search has been insufficient. No state of affairs can be described that would refute his claim, yet one can easily imagine a scenario confirming it: perhaps the gem is found in the first few minutes of searching.
Karl Popper (1902–1994) considers C2 the sole criterion for investigability because he epistemologically denies the verifiability of any universal proposition, thus rendering C1 impossible. The lapis-and-ruby example involves a particular, existential claim (not a universal one). However, if we adopt an abductive epistemology—relying on non-deductive reasoning such as inference to the best explanation, hypothetical reasoning, induction, analogy, or similar methods—C1 may also become accessible as a criterion for empirical investigability.
Regarding the signs of creation, we argue that the acquired experiences and resulting propositions are unfalsifiable yet verifiable. For instance, no state of affairs in creation can falsify the idea of resurrection (except its actual future occurrence), but certain states may increase its likelihood. Observing spring’s renewal, fetal development, or miracles like the revival of the dead by Christ’s breath—or accepting such accounts—may strengthen belief in resurrection. Thus, while no state of affairs negates resurrection (laysa li-wāqiʿatihā kādhibah), some confirm it.
Moreover, empirical investigation of *p* does not reduce its status to a contingent proposition. Here, we must distinguish between epistemic possibility (probability) and metaphysical possibility. Initially, we may not know whether a necessary truth exists in the world, epistemically allowing for its absence. Yet upon observing evidence for a necessary being (God), the metaphysical necessity of such a being becomes more probable. With sufficient evidence, we may attain certainty. For example, fine-tuning in the universe may rule out chance, leading us to infer a necessary, wise, and conscious being as the best explanation. Thus, through experience and non-deductive reasoning, we can discern metaphysical necessities. Experience here is not limited to the “context of discovery” but extends to the “context of justification.” Such necessities are a posteriori. Hume’s error was confining himself to deductive frameworks, wherein empirical access to metaphysical necessity is indeed impossible.
Therefore, relying on the observation of creation’s signs neither requires envisioning their falsification nor precludes discovering necessary truths.
7. Attaining Knowledge and Faith
If reasoning through signs and discoveries is analyzed non-deductively, can we achieve more than “probability”? Can we attain “knowledge,” “certainty,” or “faith”? Given that non-deductive arguments are not “truth-preserving,” how is this possible?
First, “knowledge” and “science” (ʿilm) are not confined to “philosophical certainty” (probability P = 1). Based on (1) Quranic usage, (2) common rational understanding, and (3) plausible epistemological theories, knowledge must be broadly construed. Quranically, consider verse 10 of Surah Al-Mumtaḥanah:
“O you who believe, when believing women come to you as emigrants, test them. Allah knows best as to their faith. If you ascertain that they are believers, do not return them to the disbelievers…”
This verse refers to a treaty between the Prophet (peace be upon him) and the Meccan polytheists. It prohibits returning believing female emigrants to disbelievers (see: Ṭūsī, n.d., vol. 9, pp. 584–586). The epistemological takeaway lies in the Quran’s method for verifying faith: testing. Since faith is inward, outward signs are fallible indicators, hence “Allah knows best as to their faith.” Yet the verse states: “If you ascertain (ʿalimtum) they are believers, do not return them.” This shows that fallible, conventional knowledge derived from observable signs qualifies as ʿilm in the Quran.
Faith, too, is described as gradable (Quran 3:173; 8:2; 9:124; 33:22; 48:4; 74:31). Abraham’s quest for certainty despite his faith (Quran 2:260) is illustrative. Imam Riḍā (peace be upon him) comments:
“He was not in doubt but sought increased certainty from Allah” (Barqī, 1371 AH, vol. 1, p. 247, no. 249; similarly in ʿAyyāshī, 1380 AH, vol. 1, p. 143, no. 472).
Second, cumulative evidence can yield “convergent probabilities,” leading to “assurance” and conventional knowledge. Each supporting datum increases a theory’s probability. Though P = 1 may remain elusive, the approach is asymptotically unrestricted. For instance, we know of distant cities we have never visited, based on diverse evidence.
Third, the Quran’s “diverse signs” (taṣrīf al-āyāt) reflect the cumulative nature of sign-based knowledge. Single verses often present multiple signs, likely to strengthen epistemic confidence.
Fourth, in probabilistic (especially Bayesian) approaches, prior probabilities may be contentious. Yet as evidence accumulates, their influence diminishes. Thus, observing creation’s signs can yield high degrees of knowledge and faith.
8. Conclusion
Reducing reasoning to logical syllogism is a major obstacle in understanding the Quran’s theological project. The Quran, via sign-based knowledge, pursues an objective and guidance-oriented theology, expecting humans to comprehend and believe in creation’s signs. Sign-based knowledge is empirical, often constituting “conventional knowledge.” It can lead to both knowledge and faith, even necessitarian truths, without degrading them to falsifiable claims.
The sign-based perspective on creation is neither limited to laypeople nor exclusive to mystical experiences—it addresses all humanity. Yet it is the rational who deeply reflect on these signs. The Quran’s epistemological framework markedly differs from classical foundationalism in Hellenized “Islamic” philosophies. It aligns with scientific realism while avoiding undue skepticism.
